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ABSTRACT
The volume of excess material is growing in virtually all
of the Armed Services. A portion of this is "invisible" to
the supply system and other potential users because it is
still in the hands of the end-user. The management problem
created by "holding" excess maybe due to disincentives for
operational units to return material. This results from the
complexity of the Material Returns Program and historically
low rate of return experienced by many of the operational
units.
This thesis evaluates the Material Returns Program from a
fleet perspective, concentrating on documented issues and
experiences. Results indicate that acceptable changes can be
implemented that will provide the incentive for end-users to
return excess material to the supply system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The procurement policy of the Department of Defense (DOD)
has long focused on providing the operational forces with
state of the art technology. The intent of the policy is to
provide our "fighting forces" with a competitive edge in
combat scenarios. However, this policy is not without its
drawbacks. As a weapon system is replaced by a newer model,
the older model, along with the repair part support, becomes
"excess". The volume of excess material is growing in
virtually all of the armed services. The Committee on the
Budget, United States Senate, estimates as much as 30 percent
of DOD spare parts inventory is excess [Ref. 1]. A portion of
this is "invisible" to the supply system and other potential
users because it is still in the hands of the end user. It is
important that the DOD focus on effective methods of managing
excess material due to the large capital investment involved.
As material becomes "excess", it must be returned to the
supply system where it will then become "visible" to potential
users, thus preventing procurement of an item already in
excess.
The responsibility for effective excess material
management involves all levels of the DOD. Upper levels need
to establish policy that will provide a sufficient incentive
to operational units to return excess material and these units
need to aggressively pursue compliance with this policy. This
thesis will address the current process in use by the U. S.
Navy, The Material Returns Program (MRP), promulgated by
NAVSUP P-437, "MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP." Overall policy concerning
the reporting of excess assets is contained in Department of
Defense Directive 4100.37, "Retention and Transfer of Material
Assets."
The Material Returns Program is designed to provide
procedures for reporting excess material in order to obtain
maximum utilization of assets. These procedures should
determine acceptability, amount of credit, and disposition of
items reported [Ref. 2]. Excess material has been a long time
problem in the U. S. Navy due to the disincentive for the
operational units to return material. This is due to the
complexity of the MRP process and the historical low rate of
return experienced by many of the operating units.
Furthermore, in the current period of decreasing DOD budgets,
it has become extremely difficult for the operating units to
maintain the required level of operational readiness with a
lower funding level. In an attempt to alleviate this
hardship, at least two Type Commanders (TYCOMs)l have
developed and implemented programs specifically designed to
'Commander Submarine Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet
(COMSUBLANT) implemented the Submarine Redistribution and
Temporary Storage program (SUBRATS) and Commander Submarine
Force U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC) implemented COMSUBPACs'
Program for Excess Redistribution (SUPER).
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manage excess material. They are able to "save" money by: 1)
holding their excess material and issuing it to other units of
their command as needed, thus avoiding the cost of procuring
the repair part through normal supply channels, and 2) selling
it back to the supply system via the MRP program.
Numerous players are involved in the Material Returns
Program. The end user (a Navy ship) turns in the material.
The Naval Supply Center(NSC)/Contractor queries the Inventory
Control Point/Item Manager (ICP/IM) and ships material to
designated stock points as directed by the ICPs' response.
The ICP/IM sends a credit response to the NSC/Contractor and,
upon notification of receipt of material by the designated
stock point, sends credit authorization to the Fleet
Accounting and Disbursing Center (FAADC) FAADC transmits
credit to the appropriate Type Commander. This process is
lengthy, inflexible, and after initial turn-in of material,
invisible to the end user. It will be further explained in
Chapter II and Chapter IV.
The magnitude of the excess material problem is
illustrated by a quote from a report on spare parts management
developed by the Majority Staff Committee on the Budget for
the Senate: "There is already an inventory of more than $100
billion worth of spare parts, including more than $30 billion
worth of it.ms which the Pentagon acknowledges as being
3
unrequired."'  The majority of this material is a result of
inappropriate procurement and is currently residing as "stock"
in the various Department of Defense supply centers.
Therefore, it is not subje!ct to processing via the Material
Returns Program. However, it does illustrate the intense
scrutiny given spare parts management. Improvements in any
facet of the management of spare parts should warrant
consideration.
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The main objective is to improve the incentive for the
operating commands to return excess material. The primary
question of concern: "What improvements can be made in the
Material Returns Program that will provide an incentive for
fleet units to return excess material?" This can be achieved
by reviewing five (5) sub-elements of the MRP and answering
specific questions relating to each.
1. Interfund Billing
What are the advantages of the Interfund Billing vs.
Intrafund Billing process as related to the MRP?
2. Credit Returns Policy
What improvements in the credit returns policy provide
the necessary motivation for operating forces to aggressively
pursue the return of excess material? What recommendations
2Further study is required in the area of valuation
methods used for excess material (i.e. devalue or apply market
value to aged material in excess).
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should the Naval Supply Systems Cour-.nd (NAVSUP) propose to
the Office cf the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to achieve these
improvements?
3. Depot Level Repairable (DLR) Packaging
Is there a cost savings achievable by improving DLR
packaging? Minor tears in DLR packaging render the iteit. not
ready for issue (NRFI). This necessitates transportatio-i
costs to a verifying activity, cost of verification and
repackaging, and cost of transportation back to a designated
stock point. Are 1 cal procedures available to rreclude this
expense?
4. Carcass Credit
What improvements can be made to improve the accuracy
and timeliness of carcass credi: processing?
5. Material Turned Into Stores (MTIS) Backlog
What can be done to alleviate MTIS backlog at the
Naval Supply Centers or contracted agencies? MTIS backlog is
a contributing cause of the issues presented in item 1. aiid
Item 4. above.
B. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This thesis will concentrate cn existing regulations and
policies as well as current data (through FY90) and
information compiled by the excess program managers of th:
Pacific and Atlantic Fleet Submarine Forces, Naval Supply
Centers, and other parties officially assigned duties in the
5
"flow" of excess material through the Material Returns
Program. Management decisions and actions taken to alleviate
observed problems with the MPP, as well as future proposed
actions will be included.
C. L'..TATIONS
The processing of excess material is accomplished by and
affects every unit in the operational chain of command and
those logistics support commands assigned material processing
taski. Time and financial resources preclude an in-depth
analysis of excess mateiial processing problems perceived by
each unit. Therefore the study is confined to data compiled
by the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet Submarine Forces and the
Naval Supply Centers located at San Diego, CA, Oakland, CA,
and Premerton, WA. Observations trom various other commands
will be included to support identified problem areas. The
recommendations for change resulting from this study will
hopefully provide workable alternatives to a well-known,
complex problem.
V ORGANIZATION
Chapter I introduces the Material Returns Program and some
of the complexities and observed problems involved in the
processing of excess material via this program. The magnitude
of the problem is presented as well as some of the critical
questions that will hopefully be answered. In addition, the
6
objectives, scope, limitations, and organization are
presented.
Chapter II discusses the philosophy aijd organization of
the Material Retu'rns Program and provides an insight to the
operation of the program by reviewing applicable directives.
In addition, general comments and data will be introduced that
illustrate problems experienced by the fleet when processing
excess material.
Chapter III addresses the research methodology used in
conducting this study. Included is a discussion of the
selected research plan, types of data obtained, the sources,
and to what extent this data are considered a reliable
representation of the overall system.
Chapter IV contains specific data compiled by the
Pacific and Atlantic Fleet Submarine Force excess material
program managers. This data include but are not limited to:
excess material inventory levels, inventory dollar levels,
rate of return on excess material in dollars and units, cost
avoidance gains, MRP processing time, defective DLR packaging
statistics, DLR credit policy issues, etc. Alternatives to
improve known problems and plans that may be currently in
process will also be discussed. Recommendations for
improvement will follow each subsection.
Chapter V summarizes the results of this study and
combines specific recommendations for the improvements
7
presented in Chapter IV that will help reduce the excess
material currently -esiding in the fleet.
8
II. BACKGROUND
For many years repair parts management has been the topic
of debate between the Department of Defense and Congressional
members seeking to trim the budget. The debate concerns the
ability to maintain a high degree of operational readiness by
ensuring weapons platforms are outfitted with state-of-the-art
equipment at an acceptable cost to the taxpayer.
In an attempt to obtain the highest degree of operational
readiness at the minimum cost, numerous models have been
developed to assist in the procurement and management of
weapon system repair parts. These models are not the subject
of this thesis, but could be a topic of further research. It
is sufficient to say that the models are difficult and
complex. Procurement is an imperfect process even with the
best of intentions and the most reliable data. Ideally, the
ldaL available bpare part would be consumed just prior to the
retirement of the supported item due to obsolescence. This is
seldom the case. Usually there are numerous repair parts
which, for their original intended purpose, become "excess".
Excess spare parts will be defined as those repair parts that
are no longer required by the end user for whom they were
initially procured. In additicn to the two reasons for excess
material previously mentioned (inadequacies of the procurement
9
process and equipment obsolescence), a third is the
decommissioning of a ship or squadron.
There are several factors which support this reasoning.
First, predicting failure rates for new equipment is extremely
difficult due to the limited data available at the time of
procurement. Furthermore, the "cost" of not having sufficient
repair part support available may be extremely high, depending
on the operational tempo at the time. Therefore, the prudent
approach would appear to be the assurance of having adequate
repair part support available at the time of need. This
assurance "guarantees" that there will be some level of excess
repair part support still on the shelf when the equipment is
replaced/retired due to obsolescence. Second, the rate of
technological advancement is unpredictable. In many cases,
new technology is available prior to old equipment wearing
out. Therefore, keeping pace with leading edge technology
will require replacement of equipment that may have several
years of physical "life" remaining (with several years of
repair part support still on the shelf). Third, current DOD
budget decreases have called for accelerated decommissioning
plans for several classes of naval ships. Decommisionings
result in the "excessing" of all on-boaid repair parts
(OBRPs).
The previous paragraphs help explain the existence of
excess, however the processing of this excess is the topic of
10
concern which will be addressed in the remainder of this
thesis.
The Department of Defense has provided direction on the
retention and transfer of material assets which stipulates
general guidelines for the ret,.cn of retail stock [Ref. 3].
The Navy has expounded on this process by implementing the
Material Returns Program, management of which is contained in
NAVSUP Pub 437, "MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP." The questions to be
discussed in later chapters are: "Is this an effective
program?" and "Does it provide the incentive for the fleet to
turn in excess material?" The remainder of this chapter will
be dedicated to the discussion of the MRP and five (5) sub-
elements of the MRP. They will be presented in the following
order:
1. Material Returns Program
2. Interfund Billing
3. Credit Returns Policy
4. Depot Level Repairable (DLR) Packaging
5. Carcass Credit
6. Material Turned Into Stores (MTIS) Backlog
A. THE MATERIAL RETURNS PROGRAM
NAVSUP PUB 437, "MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP" Section 02155 contains
procedures for all DOD activities and civil agencies offering
or returning material to a Military Service Inventory Control
11
Point, DOD Integrated Material Manager or the General Services
Administration (GSA).
These procedures provide for reporting of excess and
redistributable material from CONUS and overseas
activities to an Inventory Control Point/Integrated
Material Manager (ICP/IMM) and procedures for processing
customer reports of excess to obtain maximum utilization
of assets by determining acceptability, amount of credit
and providing disposition of items reported. Credit for
material returns is granted on the basis of receipt and
the classification documented by the consignee. These
procedures also establish the necessary controls to ensure
timely processing of related transactions and provide for
the automatic return of material under specified
conditions. [Ref. 1]
This process is complex and often lengthy (see Figure 1).
An important point to note in this illustration is that the
ship loses "visibility" of the material once it is turned into
the stock point/contractor (i.e., the process is not closed
loop) . Therefore, the unit who is most concerned with reaping
the financial benefit for their Type Commander, is no longer
a player in the process. Processing time lines will be
addressed in a following section (Item F.) of this chapter.
A more detailed illustration of the complexity of the
documentation process is illustrated by Figure 2. It is not
within the scope of this thesis to interpret specific Document
Identifier Codes (DICs) used in this process. However, a
detailed explanation and identification of the DICs are
contained in Reference 1.
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Figure 1. MRP Process
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B. INTERFUND BILLING
There are two methods of billing for issues of material
from one activity to another: the "DOD interfund billing
system" is used for all reimbursable issues of Navy material
to other DOD activities; issues of Navy material to Navy
customers are normally billed via the "intra-Navy billing
system." The major differences between the two systems are
summarized as follows:
The interfund system uses formats, data elements and
coding structures which are standard for all participants,
and allows automated transmission of billings, requests
for adjustment and subsequent adjustment data via the
Defense Automatic Addressing Systems Office (DAASO). The
formats used in the intra-Navy billing system, although
standard, cannot be transmitted via DAASO, and the Navy
system does not include a method, either manual or
mechanized, to request and obtain corrections of billing
errors. [Ref. 4]
The Interfund Billing procedures used to bill for all
reimbursable issues of Navy Stores Account (NSA) material are
contained in Reference 4. The system applicable in any given
situation is determined by the activity having cognizance over
the material in question (i.e., the Inventory Control Point).
For example, credits for Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
managed material are processed via the interfund billing
system and are posted to the fiscal year in which they are
processed and registered by the Fleet Accounting And
Disbursing Center. In contrast, credits for material managed
by the Navy Ships Parts Control Center (SPCC) are processed
15
via the intra-Navy billing process and are posted to the
fiscal year in which they are registered by SPCC.
Simply stated, once credit is authorized by the
appropriate ICP, the ICP generates a credit bill which is
forwarded to the appropriate FAADC. When the credit bill is
processed by the FAADC, credit is given to the appropriate
Type Commander via the monthly Operating Budget Detail Credit
List. Based on processing delays, it is feasible that credit
may be granted by the ICP, but not become available to the
Type Commander in time to obligate prior to the expiration of
the funds at the end of the fiscal year (estimated processing
time for SPCC cognizance material will be addressed in Item F.
of this chapter).
This latter statement can be a double penalty in that the
Navy Stock Fund has already reduced its assets by the amount
of credit granted, yet, due to the processing delay, the Type
Commander does not receive the funds in the fiscal year
granted. Thus, neither receive the benefit of the funds.
C. CREDIT RETURNS POLICY
Policy regarding the granting of credit for excess assets
is contained in Department of Defense Directive 4100.37,
"Retention and Transfer of Material Assets". In general,
wholesale inventory managers analyze reports of excess assets
submitted by retail activities and make decisions regarding
the disposition of these assets (i.e., retain or dispose).
Numerous factors, both economic and non-economic, are
16
considered when making the retention decision. Components
within the DOD are required to develop and implement their own
decision models based on economic and non-economic factors.
These models should be suitable for use by the applicable
inventory manager.
Decision model factors are categorized into three broad
areas: 1) Diminishing Manufacturing Resources, 2) Economic
Factors and 3) Non-economic Factors. DOD defines these
factors as follows:
1. Diminishing Manufacturing Sources. The first criterion
to evaluate is based on a readiness consideration, namely
diminishing sources of supply for active items in the DOD
inventory. Returns should be accepted for items that have
been approved for life-of-type buys.
2. Economic Factors. It is necessary to determine if a
proposed return should be accepted based on economic
considerations. If the stock position of the item being
considered for return is below the AFAO3, and if the
marginal unit return cost (i.e., cost to return to depot
minus cost to dispose) is less than the unit reprocurement
price, the return should be accepted. The item should not
normally be authorized for return if on a per item basis
it costs more than it would cost to reprocure. However,
a return would still be accepted if the non-economic
criteria, explained in subsection B.3., below, apply.
3. Noneconomic Factors.
a. Weapon Systems. In accordance with the policy
specified in paragraph D.l.e. of this Directive items
applicable to active weapon systems used by U.S. forces
normally should be returned.
b. Backorders. Due to the mathematical aspects of
economic return methodologies, an item could have a stock
position exceeding its authorized economic return limit
but still have outstanding backorders. This situation
could result if a large portion of an item's assets were
3Approved Force Acquisition Objective.
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due-in rather than on-hand. Therefore, returns for items
with outstanding backorders should be accepted.
c. War reserves. Returns for items authorized a war
reserve level should be accepted if the war reserve stock
requirements are not satisfied by the item's existing
wholesale assets.
d. Leadtimes. Economic return models normally assume
that an item can be reprocured within an acceptable
timeframe. In cases where it is expected that the
leadtime will be beyond an acceptable period, reported
items should be returned.
e. Demand History. If the economic return model does
not address constant or increasing demand, the demand
history criterion attempts to capture returns for these
kinds of items. By comparing the item's current demand to
its quarterly forecasted demand times a growth factor,
inventory managers will be in a position to determine if
increasing demand activity would justify accepting the
return.
f. Inventory Managers' Override. Although models
should be flexible, they will not be able to consider
properly all possible conditions. Inventory managers
should have sufficient responsibility related to the
return of items to override the above criteria. [Ref.31
As mentioned earlier, this thesis is not intended to
examine the various models used by the item managers. That
remains for others to research. What is of importance here is
whether this policy provides the necessary incentive for the
fleet to aggressively pursue the return of material assets.
The implementation of specific programs to manage and store
excess material by the Pacific and Atlantic Fleet Submarine
Forces suggest the incentive is not sufficient. Additional
data and observations concerning this issue will be discussed
in detail in following chapters.
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D. DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (DLR) PACKAGING
Packaging requirements are delineated in various military
specifications that are determined during the procurement
process. These specifications may call for three (3) multiple
levels of packaging (shipping container, quantity unit pack,
and the inner barrier bag) to ensure DLR protection. The
durability of the inner packaging is of utmost importance to
fleet units for two reasons: although Military Standards
(MIL-STDs) call for submarines to use stowage at the quantity
unit pack, the limited stowage space on submarines, often
necessitates the removal of all exterior packaging, except the
inner wrap, so that the submarine may acconurodate the required
allowance of material on board; and any perforation of the
interior wrap renders the DLR not-ready-for-issue (NRFI).
In the context of the MRP, this second issue can be a very
expensive factor. If the unit is declared NRFI, the best that
can be achieved by the Type Commander is "carcass va'ue
credit" (i.e., the difference between standard and net price)
[Ref. 2]. Improper handling of DLR's in itself is not
excusable. However, improvements in the durability of
packaging would help prevent inadvertent perforations. These
issues are well-known and some actions have been taken to
alleviate the problem. For example, there is a new Military
19
Standard under consideration which contains the foilowing
requirements: [Ref. 5]
a. Fire-retardant packaging materials
b. Transparent and minimum/reduced cube unit pLotection
c. Sensitive electronic item protection
d. Exclusions
e. Asbestos item protection
f. Repair parts (nonrepairable/consumable) and spares
(repairable) protection
g. Shipment markings
h. Quality assurance provisions
Also, so-me TYCOMs are placing an emphasis on guidance and
training for DLR handling as well as including a review of
DL1s dur ng routine Supply Management Inspections (SMIs).
The implications of DLR packaging will be discussed in
more detail in Chapter IV.
E. CARCASS CREDIT
Not-Ready-For-Issue (NRFI) DLRs are returned to the
Advanced Traceability and Control (ATAC) hub in accordanca
with instructions contained in NLJSUP Pub P-485, "Afloat
Supply Procedures"; NAVSUP Pub P-545, "Navy Stock Fund Depot
Level Repairables (NSF-DLR) Procedures Desk Guide"; and NAVSUP
P-437, " MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP". Additional guidance has been
provided in NAVSUP Newsletter 89-1. Unfortunately, the
guidance is contradictory in regards to who is responsible for
20
completing certain data blocks of the DD 1348-1 turn-in
document. In addition, the inconsistent use of application
"R",4 of the Uniform Automated Data Processing System (UADPS)
has further exacerbated the situation. This has resulted in
credit not being granted for material when processed through
the Uniform Inventory Control Point (UICP) credit
interrogation module B015 application program. This process
is under review and is being corrected, therefore it may be a
solved problem upon completion of this thesis.
F. MATERIAL TURNED INTO STORES (NTIS) BACKLOG
Guidance for MTIS is prcvided in NAVSUPINST 4440.157.
However, time constraints for material processing are not
included. Delays in processing may result in expiration of
authorized credit. This may be a source of the problems
identified in the Interfund Billing process and the Carcass
Credit process identified above. For SPCC cognizance
material, the estimated processing timeline is illustrated in
Figure 3. Specific observations will be discussed in the
analysis chapter of this thesis.
In summary, the sub-elements of the MRP addressed above
are considered to be essential factors in the successful
management of excess material. Correcting any one of the
4If the Stock Point is using application "R" for
processing material, when a carcass is determined to be NRFI,
and the status of the material is changed from an "A"
condition (RFI) to an NRFI status, the required data blocks
referred to above will be completed automatically.
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identified problems will be beneficial, however, they are all
interrelated, so to be thorough and effective, all should be
addressed. It should also be noted that the issues identified
in this chapter are not new, they are issues which, given the
current decrease in the DOD budget, have warranted increased
scrutiny from the fleet perspective.
22
MTIS PROCESSING TIME-LINE
EVENT AND ESTIMATED TIMES TO COMPLETE
CUSTOMER INTERROGATION/OFFER (FTE)
1. SPCC CREDIT AUTHORIZATION (FTR)
5 DAYS
2. CUSTOMER SHIPMENT OF TURN-IN
5 DAYS
3. MATERIAL TRANSIT TIME
30 DAYS






7. CUSTOMER RECFIVES $$$$
120 DAYS UNTIL INITIAL CREDIT AUTHORIZATION EXPIRES
"CLOCK" STARTS WITH FTR AND ENDS WITH TIR
Figure 3. MTIS Processing Time-line
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III. METHODOLOGY
The attention given to the effective management of spare
parts within the Department of Defense in recent years co-.pled
with a declining defense budget has resulted in an increased
focus on the Material Returns Program as a helpful solution to
both problems. For instance, both the Pacific and Atlantic
Fleet Submarine Forces have established specific programs for
the management of excess material. The Pacific Fleet Polaris
Material Office (PMOPAC) operates COMSUBPAC's Program for
Excess Redistribution (SUPER) and the Atlantic Fleet Polaris
Material Office (PMOLANT) operates the Submarine
Redistribution and Temporary Storage program (SUBRATS). Each
program is designed as a centralized control point of the
"excess material" generated by all the operating units
assigned to the respective Type Commander. The data presented
in this thesis were generated and compiled by these programs.
Research methods employed in this analysis include:
personal experience, field research, documentation review and
telephone interviews.
These methods were chosen for several reasons. Much of
the information was gathered through personal observations.
Additional information was well documented and readily
available from the excess material programs. "SUPER" and
"SUBRATS" are relatively new programs which have received
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close monitoring by higher authority. Telephone interviews
were conducted with other commands involved in the MRP in
order to substantiate and verify information provided by the
o;xz8rs nahvzlial progian. Data were obtained f-nm "point
papers" that were prepared and submitted by various commands
as topics of interest to be discussed during the annual Fleet
Industrial Support Conference (FISC). However, only data
relevant to the Material Returns Program were solicited from
these papers. Much of the information is well documented by
other commands in the MRP processing chain. Finally,
Department of Defense and Naval publications, directives, and
instructions, governing facets of the Material Returns Program
are considered to be matters of fact.
Despite these advantages, this research has a limited
scope5 because there was limited time and financial support
to conduct an in-depth detailed analysis of such a complex
process. Recommendations based on information gathered from
limited sources may skew the overall "reasonableness" of the
conclusions.
The decision to analyze and research the MRP was based on
personal experience. I recognized the need for increased
attention to excess material while serving as the Supply
Officer aboard a nuclear powered submarine undergoing overhaul
at the Charleston Naval Shipyard. My subsequent tour was on
5Only West Coast Naval Supply Centers were solicited for
information concerning the MRP and only documentation compiled by
"SUPER" and "SUBRATS" were used in the analysis.
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the staff of PMOPAC. During this tour, PMOPAC initiated and
implemented "SUPER". The organizational structure of PMOPAC
was changed to incorporate a department dedicated solely to
the management of excess material. The problems identified in
this thesis are those observed personally while processing
excess material via the MRP. Data generated subsequent to my
transfer was collected by field research.
Some problems identified are in the process of being
corrected at this time. Reasonable effort was expended to
ascertain any proposed changes to the program and to recognize
such in Chapters II and IV of this thesis.
The analysis of this data is based on existing guidelines
versus observed processes. Recommendations for alternative
procedures, which may improve the Material Returns Program and
provide the incentive for the "fleet" to return excess
material are also based on data acqu.red in this study.
in summary, methods used to analyze the MRP were driven by
fleet concerns (bottom-up approach) versus an alternate view
such as a policy analysis (top-down approach). The intent is
to identify alternatives to existing policy that will provide
an acceptable solution, for all parties concerned, to the




The decade of the eighties began with an unprecedented
growth in the peacetime defense budget. Many new weapons
systems and accompanying repair part support were procured
during this period. However, by 1985 the growth period
subsided and, in real terms, the defense budget declined
throughout the remainder of the decade.
The declining budget has made it increasingly difficult
for the "fleet" to maintain the level of operational readiness
required to accomplish their mission. Therefore it is
extremely important that operational units manage their
resources effectively. The Atlantic and Pacific Fleet
Submarine Forces have both implemented programs to manage
excess material in order to conserve financial resources. The
Atlantic Fleet program is called "Submarine Redistribution and
Temporary Storage" (SUBRATS) and is managed by the Atlantic
Fleet Polaris Material Office (PMOLANT). The Pacific Fleet
program is called "COMSUBPAC's Program for Excess
Redistribution" (SUPER) and is managed by the Pacific Fleet
Polaris Material Office (PMOPAC).
At the end of fiscal year 1990 SUBRATS maintained an
inventory of 75,586 line items with an extended value of
$83, 217, 451 [Ref. 6]. SUPER maintained an inventory of 5,951
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line items with an extended value of $16,500,000. PMOLANT and
PMOPAC conserve financial resources by "holding" excess
material for future issuance to the operating forces thus
avoiding the cost of requisitioning the material from the
supply system. They also "sell" excess material back to the
supply system via the Material Returns Program. It is the
latter that will be the focus of the following analysis. The
various subsets of the MRF will be discussed in the same order
as presented in the background information.
B. INTERFUND BILLING
At this point it is important to emphasize a problem with
SPCC and DLA cognizance material which was addressed
previously in background information. SPCC cognizance
material as processed through the Navry :ntrafund billing
process. Credits are "posted" to the fiscal year in which
they are registered by SPCC. Conversely, DLA cognizance
material is processed through the interfund billing process
and credits are "posted" in the fiscal year in which FAADC
registers the credit.
The problem arises because of the elapsed time before
credit is authorized and received by the Type Commander.
Credit must be received in time to obligate the funds before
obligational authority expires at the end of the fiscal year.
For DLA cognizance material, it is much easier to "predict"
the receipt of funds at the TYCOM level because FAADC
registers the credit and processes the funds transfer between
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"buyer" and "seller". For SPCC cognizance material, SPCC
registers the credit but the processing of funds transfer is
accomplished at the FAADC. This adds an additional step which
complicates the predictability and timing of fund processing.
SPCC's estimated time to complete the MTIS processing was
introduced in Chapter II (Figure 3). The timeline is
reintroduced here in a slightly different format for
comparison purposes (Figure 4). 6
Figure 4 illustrates SPCCs' estimate of the MRP timeline
from the moment the inquiry (offer to sell) is received by the
ICP until credit arrives at the TYCOM (sell complete). Figure
5 illustrates PMOPAC observed processing times for material
which was directed to be turned in to NSC Oakland. Similarly,
Figure 6 illustrates PMOPAC observed processing times for
material turned in at NSC Puget Sound. The combined message
these figures present is the unpredictability of the time it
takes to complete the process. PMOPAC is a tenant command of
NSC Puget Sound so transit time was naturally expected to be
lower. In either case, however, credit was not received in
time to obligate the funds.
Interpre-ation of the observed time lines could lead one
to the conclusion that FAADC was the primary "cause" of the
processing delay. This is not a valid assumption. The UICP
B015 (MTIS program) applications program does not provide
61988 Fleet Industrial Support Conference; Excerpt from SPCC
MTIS Processing Time-line Event and Estimated Times to Complete.
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SPCC MRP PROCESSING TIME LINE
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Figure 4. SPCC Estimate of the MRP Processing Time Line
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OBSERVED MRP PROCESSING TIME LINE (8032/8033)
1CP RESPONSE M 5
MATL PULLED 20
TRANSIT TIME W10




1I I I I I ~ I
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 n0 100 110 120 130 140 150 160 170 180 190 220 210 220 230 240
DAYS
Figure 5. Observed MP Processing Time Line (NSC Oakland)
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Figure 6. Observed MRP Processing Time Line (NSC Puget Sound)
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"bill numbers" to FAADC. FAADC maintains records based on the
hill number-. Therefore, there is no simple way to follow-up
or to obtain status on transactions passed from SPCC to
FAADC. Hence, t..ie inordinate delay between these two points
in the MRP process. The plan was to correct this problem
during the UICP Resystemization. uue to fiscal constraints,
resystemization :j on hold.
The impact on the Pacific Fleet Subndrine Force is
summarized in the following:
Given the fact that it takes an average of 22) days
before COMSUBPAC realizes credit for an item turned in
under the MRP, the problem of how to manage and properly
expend credits which have either expired or will buon
expire is particular'- exasperating. The development of
a counter productive 'gaming' situation then arises in
which the fleet guesses when it is best to interrogate for
credit and then hopes it guesses correctly. During the
last two (2) years COMSUBPAC has lost $683,000 in SPCC
credits because the credi's expired before they were
received. This represents 12.7% of the total MRP credits
authorized for the return of SUPER material." (Ref. 7]
Recommendation: SPCC use the interfund billing process
for material processed via the MRP protjrqm and modify UICP
B015 to assign bill numbers to items processed in order to
provide a means of tracing the item between SPCC and FAADC.
It should be noted that if this recommendation is made,
consideration must be given to the impact on Shipboard Uniform
Automated Data Processing System 207 (SUADPS-207) reporting
ships as they also report credits. Implementation of these
two recommendations would help eliminate the unpredictability
of "timing" the interrogation process. Use of the interfund
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billing process will eliminate the uncertainty associated with
one command (SPCC) registering the credit and another command
(FAADC) acttually processing the funds transfer with additional
processing required in between. Assignment of bill numbers
close the "loop" in the ability to trace the material through
the MRP from point of interrogation to funds transfer.
C. CREDIT RETURNS POLICY
In a point paper addressed to the 7leet Industrial Support
Conference, CCMSUBTJANT noted that during FY86 three Atlantic
Fleet submarines turned in approxi.ately $7.7 million dollars
worth of RFI material for TYCOM credit. As of 18 March 1987
credits amounted to $400,000. This represents a 5.2 percent
return on the dollar. COMSUBLANT further stated:
This rate of return is unacceptable. The stock fund
is benefitting at the expense of the Fleet. [Ref. 81
In a point paper addressed to the same FISC, Pearl Harbor
Naval Shipyara qtates:
The shipyards receive credit from the NSF on only a
small percent of the material returned. Therefore,
current credit policy discourages return of material and
encourages 'goldpiling'
These are but a sampling, there were other point papers
submitted that echoed this sentiment as well.
The NAVSUP reply to the point papers was: "...since the
NSF is F 'break even' appropriation these increased credits
would have to be financed by increased prices to all other NSF
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customers. Overall existing policy is considered to achieve
the desired goals and to be appropriate." [Ref. 9]
Again in 1988 the subject of the credit returns policy was
an issue at the FISC. An issue paper dated 12 May 1988,
prepared by SPCC Code 0411 states:
We have made significant progress in liberalizing
existing credit return policies. Through short-term
initiatives such as our manual review high-dollar no-
credit decisions (which ignores unawarded purchase
requests), our figures show an increase in credit granted
from 5 percent to 35-40 percent on the dollar.
The recommendation by SPCC at this time was to continue
with efforts to liberalize the "return for credit" policies
and programs.
A year later, in 1989, the FISC again addressed the issues
of the credit returns policy. In a credit policy statement
dated 29 March 89, SPCC Code 0411 states: "Over the past 2
years the percent of dollar value of credit return has
increased from 11 percent to 24 percent based on two policy
changes."
PMOPAC stated they were experiencing a "6 cents on the
dollar" credit return rate and recommended an across-the-board
"75 cents on the dollar" policy. Naval Shipyard Portsmouth
recommended full credit for all left-over material ordered in
advance of scheduled ship maintenance on a "contingency"
basis.
SPCC Code 0411 promulgated an issue paper on 12 May 89
stating:
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DOD and Navy policy limit credit to requirements
projected over a two year horizon to ensure credit is
offered only for material which can be re-sold. NSY
Portsmouth and PMOPAC recommendations are inconsistent
with the current DOD/SUP policy. Furthermore they would
jeopardize stock fund ability to procure/repair material
we are selling.
A review of two credit interrogation processes by PMOPAC
revealed the following data. On julian dates 8032/8033,
PMOPAC offered approximately $9 million dollars worth of
excess material to the MP process. The resultant return was
13.4% on the dollar. A year later on julian date 9060, PMOPAC
interrogated the system with approximately $9.5 million
dollars worth of excess, and again the result was 13% on the
dollar. In both instances, however, they were directed to
return approximately 68% of the material offered at no credit.
Equally important is the fact that some commands are
generating substantial savings through cost avoidance (i.e.,
filling a material requirement from their own excess versus
"buying" the item through the supply system). PMOLANT
generated $7,502,100 in cost avoidance in FY89 and $6,968,992
in FY90. This is over twice the amount received as credit for
material turned into the Supply System. In addition, the
Inactive Supply Ship Overhaul Team (ISSOT) at Oakland recently
filled over 70% of the material shortages of a submarine going
through an Integrated Logistics Overhaul (ILO) from their
storage of excess material [Ref. 10].
The numerous point papers concerning the credit returns
policy coupled with the analysis of two material processes by
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PMOPAC support the conclusion that the credit returns policy
does not provide the fleet a sufficient incentive for the
return of excess material. It is also evident from cost
avoidance data that there is a need for much of the material
that is currently being denied credit.
Recommendation: Pursue a policy of granting an across-
the-board return rate for RFI material, which still has
weapons system applicability, that would be acceptable to the
Type Commanders. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
generate the appropriate financial model that could balance
the return rate with costs incurred by adapting this policy 7 .
However, from the management perspective, incremental
implementation of this policy would help balance the "flood"
of excess material from the fleet. Once implemented, the
process must be timely.
Possible advantages of this policy include:
1. Excess material is purged from the fleet.
2. A "predictable flow" of material could be realized and
managed.
3. All excess material would now be "visible" within the
supply system.
4. Procurement action could be delayed and/or cancelled
for many items.
7In establishing the rate of return, the possibility exists
that an excessive rate may encourage fleet units to "over-order"
spare parts. Therefore, consideration should be given to the
trade-off between the appropriate incentive to return excess
material and the potential adverse effects of an excessive rate.
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5. All material that is currently being recorded as "cost-
avoidance", by excess programs such as "SUPER" and
SUBRATS", would be "sales" of the supply system.
6. Inventory management credibility for supply system
stock would be increased.
Possible disadvantages include:
1. This policy may temporarily place the system in "long-
supply".
2. It may create a temporary financial burden on the Navy
Stock Fund.
3. Some Navy Stock Fund customers may be unduly penalized
when the "price" of stock is increased with the surcharge
that must be applied to offset increased outlays for
excess.
It should be noted that the disadvantages listed here
could be minimized by the incremental implementation
addressed above. The "cleaning up" of the excess in the
fleet should be perceived as a long-term process that will
outweigh any short term burdens.
D. DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABLE (DLR) PACKAGING
NAVSUP Depot Level Repairable (DLR) Newsletter, Volume 88-
1, dated 1 June 1988 provides a brief explanation of policy
concerning the return of DLR's.
Current policy states that material turned in as 'A'
condition excess will be accepted only if certain
inspection criteria are met. The material must be in an
original manufacturer's package/container, or have been
repackaged and properly documented by an approved repair
activity. Any repackaging must conform to the proper
method and level as called out by current instructions,
and must be sealed and free from any abnormal physical
damage when received by the stock point to ATAC Hub.
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Material received not meeting this criteria is subject to
reclassification to the appropriate code and will be
processed accordingly. If there is any doubt on the part
of the receiving activity concerning the condition code,
policy dictates that the material will be stored in a NRFI
condition (code E or F).
Constrained stowage on submarines has resulted in the
common practice of removing DLR's from the shipping container
and the quantity unit pack then stowing the material with only
the inner barrier bag as protection. The most frequent type
of packaging observed for DLR's was a thin foil wrap with a
gummed label containing identification markings. Although
this packaging meets MIL-B-131F standards, it is easily ripped
or torn by normal handling and stowage. Under the existing
rules, these DLR's must be declared NRFI. It was also
observed that many afloat storekeepers are stapling receipt
paperwork (DD 1348-1) to the packaging. The staples penetrate
the packaging and renders the material NRFI. In trying to
ascertain why this obvious error in handling was occurring, it
was noted that neither NAVSUP Publications P-485, "Afloat
Supply Procedures"; P-437, "MILSTRIP/MILSTRAP"; P-545 "Navy
Stock Fund Depot Level Repairables Procedures Desk Guide"; nor
the Storekeeper 3&2 Rate Training Manual, contain guidance for
the proper handling of DLRs.
As of 3 Jan 90, COMSUBPAC has lost credit for the return
of over $300,000 in excess DLRs which were declared NRFI by
the receiving stock point due to minor packaging
discrepancies. In addition, over $4 million in excess DLRs
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were shipped directly to the ATAC Hub due to packaging
discrepancies identified during initial SUPER material receipt
inspection. (Ref. 7]
COMSUBPAC statistics by fiscal year are as follows: In
FY89, 70 DLRs were rejected for minor packaging discrepancies
out of 150 submitted. In FY90, 99 were rejected out of 330
submitted. Of the 99 rejected, approximately 80% was due to
minor tears or staples in the packaging, 15% was due to
material not being in original manufacturers packaging, and
the remainder was due to missing manufacturers identification
labels. COMSUBPAC has since provided guidance to their units
on proper DLR handling and stowage. [Ref. 11]
Recommendations:
1. Pursue research for a reinforced DLR packaging that is
less prone to rips or tears during normal handling.
2. Ensure DLR handling procedures are incorporated in
supply publications.
3. Ensure fleet is properly trained on handling
procedures and made aware of the scope of the current
problem.
4. Inspect DLR handling procedures during normal Supply
Management Inspections (SMIs).
5. Type Commanders research feasibility of funding the
costs of verifying DLRs RFI and repackaging prior to
turn-in for credit.8
Advantages expected from these recommendations are as
follows:
8A cost analysis was not completed for this recommendation.
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1. DLRs not damaged by routine or inappropriate handling.
2. Taxpayers save money by avoiding DLR repair costs.
3. Type Commander earns credit for returning excess RFI
DLRs.
Possible disadvantages include:
1. Reinforced DLR packaging may be cost prohibitive in the
short-run.
2. Currently, the TYCOM has no assurance that funds
expended to verify DLRs RFI and repackage will recouped
up by the subsequent sale.
Implementation of the across-the-board rate of return,
recommended earlier in this thesis, would alleviate this
problem. Whether reinforced packaging is pursued or not is a
financial question. Inclusion of DLR handling procedures in
supply publications, fleet training on DLR handling, and
including DLR handling procedures as an element of the SMI is
a matter of effective management.
E. CARCASS CREDIT
The $4 million worth of NRFI DLRs mentioned in Item D.
above were immediately sent to the ATAC Hub. Carcass credit
was not granted for this material because it was not processed
through the credit interrogation module, UICP B015, as an end-
user owned DLR. Material only passes through the UICP B015 as
an end-use DLR if a project code of "RDE" is entered in card
columns 57-59 of the DD 1348-1 turn-in document. There is
conflicting guidance as to who is responsible for entering the
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"RDE" in columns 57-59. NAVSUP P-485, P-545, and P-437
directs the end-user to leave CC 57-59 of the DD 1348-1 blank.
NAVSUP P-437 states that the reporting stock point will insert
the "RDE". Conversely, NAVSUP Depot Level Repairable (DLR)
Newsletter, Volume 89-1, dated 1 March 1989, states that the
end-user is responsible for entering "RDE" in cc 57-59 of the
DD 1348-1. SPCC attempted a manual review of the 1411 DLRs
worth approximately $4 million. The result was approximately
$7,000 granted to the TYCOM [Ref. 12]. NAVSUP has taken
action to correct this problem. An excerpt from NAVSUP
message 071315Z OCT 89 states:
4. NAVSUP is reviewing RDE project code info in pubs 545,
437, and 485 to ensure consistency. Any requested changes
will be incorporated into the next pub updates.
5. NAVSUP will also review receipt processing logic to
ensure that RDE project code is automatically inserted
during receipt processing of excess NRFI DLRs and that the
transaction will be passed to UICP B015 for potential
credit.
Recommendations: Ensure guidance is consistent across all
authoritative publications. Until changes can be
incorporated, NAVSUP should direct ATAC and/or the applicable
stock points to insert "RDE" in cc 57-59 of the DD 1348-1
turn-in document. UICP B015 applications program will then
process the material as an end-use DLR and the appropriate
credit will be granted. It is understood that appropriate
action may already be in process and the problems identified
above may be corrected by the time this thesis is completed.
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F. MATERIAL TURNED INTO STORES (MTIS) BACKLOG
The issue with the MTIS processing is the inconsistency of
processing times. This inconsistency contributes to, or is
the source of the problems identified in Items B and E above.
Inconsistency in processing prevents the "seller" from
accurately predicting the length of the "time-line" involved
in the return of material. Therefore sellers tend to "hold"
material collected during the current fiscal year until the
new fiscal year, and then "dump" it into the system. This
increases their probability of receiving funds in time to
reobligate them before they expire at the end of the fiscal
year. NSC Puget Sound reported an MTIS backlog of 2,600 line
items at the end of September 1990 and a backlog of 13,075 at
the end of October 1990 [Ref. 13], illustrating the large dump
that occurs at the beginning of the fiscal year.
NSC Puget Sound expects an average of 10-20 days backlog
at any given time. However, as Figure 7 illustrates9, the
wide fluctuation that occurs over any given fiscal year, is
verification of the claim that MTIS processing time lines are
inconsistent. MTIS processing times also vary among the Stock
Points. NSC Oakland reports a backlog of approximately one
(1) year as of October 1990 [Ref. 14]. This was based on a
backlog of 19,143 line items, four personnel assigned to work
9Data used in the preparation for Figure 7 was compiled during
a phone conversation between LT Eades, student, NPGS/Sue Madsen,
NSC Puget Sound, Code 300.
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LINE ITEMS
IN BACKLOG FY88 FY89 FY90
HIGH 6500 3415 2600
LOW 50 53 225
AVERAGE 1181 1071 883
PROCESSING
BACKLOG (DAYS)
HIGH 65 78 18
LOW 0 1 1
AVERAGE 18 23 12
Figure 7. NSC Puget Sound MTIS Processing Statistics
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material, and an average of 77 line items processed per man-
day. NSC San Diego reports approximately 38,000 line items in
backlog at the end of FY90, or about 31 days of backlog [Ref.
15]. This is based on 1200 line items processed per day.
However, at San Diego, estimates of MTIS backlog at the
beginning of FY90 was 150 days and in prior years, estimates
were as high as 200 days.
It should be noted that the variances in processing times
and backlog are not a reflection on management policy or
individual processors, but are merely a reflection of the
inconsistency inherent in the MTIS process. Three examples
that are indicative of situations that contribute to the
problem are: unplanned operations, such as "Operation Desert
Shield," draw resources away from MTIS processing to more
urgent requirements associated with the "loading-out" of
afloat units for deployment to the Middle East; decisions by
a higher authority to decommission an aircraft carrier in San
Diego will "overwhelm" the MTIS process as literally hundreds
of thousands of line items are dumped into the system; and
funding levels may not be commensurate with the manpower
requirements needed to accommodate the highly fluctuating flow
of MTIS material.
PMOPAC observed processing times, included in Figures 5
and 6 of this chapter, also illustrate variances in MTIS
processing.
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Recommendations: Promulgate policy concerning time
limitations allowed at each stage of the MTIS process and
accompany this with a Management Information System (MIS) for
monitoring/management purposes. Implementation of this
recommendation will not necessarily reduce the inconsistency
of MTIS processing. Coupled with the recommendations provided
in Items IV. B. and IV. E. above, however, it will ensure the
fleet that credit is forthcoming. As the material enters the
"queue" at the processing facility, current backlog divided by
processing ability would give a reasonable estimate of the
date credit could be expected. Consistent processing will
also assist in the formulation and stabilization of the Credit
Returns Policy discussed in Item IV. C. above.
In summary, this chapter has identified several fleet
issues concerning the Material Returns Program. Each problem
has been substantiated by fleet observations. The
recommendations for improvement are considered a viable
solution to pursue in order to help alleviate the burdensome
challenges generated by decreasing defense budgets, increasing




The basis for researching the Mterial Returns Program was
the apparent lack of sufficient incEntives for fleet units to
return excess material. This thesir has attempted t,, identify
general weaknesses in the Materipi Retuirns Program and to make
specific recommendations for improvement. However, each of
the sub-elements discussed in this thesis are complex issues
in and of themselves and siould be considered as a topic of
further research.
This thesis did not in-end to reflect on management
decisions or ability of any cimmand, but rather to document
the concern for the problem of excess material as observed
from a fleet perspective. Hopefu2ly, this thesis has served
to attract interest to the Materiil Returns Program and to
promote action to improve this process.
A summary of the recommendatio-is pzesented in Chapter IV
of this thesis are presented below.
A. INTERFUND BILLING
1. SPCC adopt the interfund billing process.
2. Modify UICP B015 to assign b.11 numbers in order to
provide a means of tracing material.
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B. CREDIT RETURNS POLICY
1. Grant an across-the-board rate of return for RFI material
which has weapon system applicability.
2. Implement the new policy in increments.
C. DEPOT LEVEL REPAIRABL2 (DLR) PACKAGING
1. Research feasibility of reinforced DLR packaging.
2. Incorporate DLR handling procedures in supply
publications.
3. Train fleet personnel on DLR handling procedures.
4. Inspect DLR handling procedures during routine SMIs.
5. TYCOMS research feasibility of funding the cost of
verifying DLRs RFI and repackaging prior to turn-in for
credit.
D. CARCASS CREDIT
1. Ensure guidance concerning material turn-in procedures
is consistent across all authoritative publications.
2. NAVSUP direct ATAC or applicable stock points to insert
"RDE" in cc 57-59 of the DD 1348-1 turn-in document, thus
preventing potential loss of credit to end-users.
E. MATERIAL TURNED INTO STORES (MTIS) BACKLOG
1. Promulgate policy concerning time limitations allowed
at each stage of the MTIS process.
2. Implement a Management Information System for
monitoring/management of the policy.
3. Pursue consistency in MTIS processing.
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Once the recommendations of this or other studies have
been implemented, additional analysis should be conducted to
ascertain whether or not the program is improving and to
identify alternatives that may prove more beneficial.
F. FURTHER RESEARCH
Additional study is required in valuation methods of
material in excess. Should DOD components amortize inventory
over time, apply market value, use cost, etc.? This is a
critical issue when cost/benefit decisions are made concerning
disposition of excess material or in the determination of
credit authorized.
Procurement and inventory management models deserve
further study as well. Emphasis should be placed on
maintaining "visibility" of DOD supply support throughout the
life-cycle of the weapons system.
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